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ABSTRACT
We consider an equilibrium search model with on-the-job search where Þrms set wages. If
employers are perfectly aware of all workers job opportunities, then when an employee receives
an outside job oﬀer, it is optimal for their employer to try to retain them by matching the oﬀer,
so long as the resulting wage doesnt exceed the workers productivity. A Bertrand competition
is thus triggered between the incumbent employer and the poacher, which results in a wage
increase for the worker.
However, if workers are able to vary their search intensity, then this oﬀer-matching policy
runs into a moral hazard problem. Knowing that outside oﬀers lead to wage increases, workers
are induced to search more intensively, which is costly for the Þrms. Assuming that Þrms can
commit never to match outside oﬀers, we examine the set of Þrm types for which it is preferable
to do so. We derive suﬃcient conditions for the equilibrium to be of the sort all Þrms match or
no Þrm matches. Finally, computed examples show that, even though virtually any situation
can be observed in equilibrium when the suﬃcient conditions are not met, a plausible pattern
is one where a dual labor market emerges, with bad jobs at low-productivity, nonmatching
Þrms and good jobs at high-productivity, matching Þrms.
Keywords: Labor market frictions, wage dispersion, search eﬀort, moral hazard.
JEL codes: J31, J61, J64.
RESUME
Nous considérons un modèle de recherche demploi déquilibre avec recherche pendant lemploi
où les Þrmes Þxent les salaires. Sous lhypothèse dinformation complète et en labsence deﬀort
de recherche, la stratégie optimale des Þrmes est de conditionner le salaire oﬀert sur létat du
travailleur (employé ou non, à quel salaire) et de contrer autant que possible toute oﬀre ex-
térieure faite à un employé. Lorsque leﬀort de recherche est endogène, il se peut quil soit dans
lintérêt de lemployeur de ne pas surenchérir sur une oﬀre extérieure et retenir un employé, de
façon à réduire lincitation à chercher. Nous dérivons des conditions suﬃsantes pour quil ex-
iste un équilibre de marché dans lequel aucune Þrme ne répond à une telle agression extérieure
ou au contraire toutes répondent. Nous montrons aussi diﬀérentes simulations numériques
dans lesquelles apparait un marché dual où certaines Þrmes répondent aux oﬀres extérieures et
dautres sabstiennent.
Mots-clés : Frictions sur le marché du travail, dispersion des salaires, eﬀort de recherche,
hazard moral.
ClassiÞcation JEL : J31, J61, J64.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers an equilibrium job search model with on-the-job search where Þrms set
wages. As was shown by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a, 2002b), if employers are perfectly
aware of all workers characteristics and job opportunities, then it is optimal for them to oﬀer
their reservation wage to any worker the Þrm comes in contact with. Also, when an employed
worker receives an outside job oﬀer, it is optimal for the incumbent employer to try to retain the
worker by matching the outside oﬀer, so long as the resulting wage doesnt exceed the workers
marginal productivity. This triggers a Bertrand game between the incumbent employer and the
poacher, which results in either a wage increase or a job change for the worker.
In this paper we examine the following point: If workers are able to vary their job search
intensity, then the oﬀer-matching behavior of Þrms runs into a moral hazard problem. Know-
ing that outside oﬀers are matched by the employers and thus lead to wage increases, workers
are induced to search more intensively, which can be very costly for the Þrms. The latter thus
face a trade-oﬀ between loosing proÞtable workers at a relatively low frequency if they dont
match oﬀers, and being forced to grant relatively frequent wage increases if they do.
We look at a situation where heterogeneous Þrms can commit never to match outside oﬀers,
and examine the set of Þrm types for which it is preferable to do so. We derive suﬃcient
conditions on the parameters for the equilibrium to be of the type all Þrms match or no
Þrm matches. We also show in computed examples that, when the suﬃcient conditions are
not met, basically any situation can be observed in equilibrium. We argue that a plausible
situation is one where high-productivity Þrms choose to match oﬀers, while lower-productivity
Þrms choose to commit not to match oﬀers. The labor market then looks dual, with bad
jobs at low-productivity Þrms paying low wages and oﬀering no within-Þrm career prospects,
and good jobs at more productive Þrms that try to retain their workers from being poached
by their competitors, thus regularly granting wage increases.
Our contribution is directly related to two strands of literature. One is obviously the equi-
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librium job search literature (see e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999 and Mortensen, 2002
for surveys and recent developments), and the other is the literature on individual employment
contracts (see Malcomson, 1999, for a survey).
The former conveys the general idea that, even though market frictions are a source of
employer monopsony power, the possibility that worker have to search for alternative job oﬀers
while employed is a limitation to that employer monopsony power, as it brings Þrms into some
sort of imperfect Bertrand competition. However, the search literature puts relatively little
direct emphasis on the strategic aspects of employees search for a better job. Insights in
this matter are provided in a series of papers by Mortensen and coauthors (see e.g. the two
references cited earlier, and also Christensen et alii, 2001) where the job search eﬀort put forth
by workersand in particular by employed workersis made endogenous. Mortensen shows
under reasonably (un)restrictive assumptions that, as one should expect, higher paid employees
search less actively, with the satisfactory implication that higher paying Þrms have lower rates
of labor turnover. He does so, however, in a particular context where Þrms are only allowed
to post Þxed wages, i.e. to use contracts where by assumption wages are constant over the
duration of job matches.
Clearly, there are both empirical and theoretical objections to this restriction. Empirically,
standard wage regressions always have a positive estimated coeﬃcient on job tenure. On the
theory side, the individual employment contract literature generically predicts that wages vary
within an employment relationship in reaction to changes in the Þrms or the workers outside
opportunities (see e.g. Malcomsons 1999 survey and the related evidence in Beaudry and
DiNardo, 1991). In the context of a labor market aﬀected by search frictions, the fact of Þnding
an alternative employment opportunity certainly constitutes a change in the workers outside
option which is likely to cause a wage renegotiation. Now, even if renegotiation is not allowed
for, as in the wage-posting setup, on-the-job search is nevertheless a source of moral hazard that
renders Þxed-wage contracts non optimal, as emphasized by two recent contributions of Stevens
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(2000) and Burdett and Coles (2001). In a frictional labor market, Þrms will seek to retain
their employees by oﬀering wage-tenure contracts. Note that the critic addressed by Stevens,
Burdett and Coles to the Burdett-Mortensen (1989) model is the same as the bonding critic
made to Shapiro and Stiglitz (see for example Carmichael, 1990, and Cahuc and Zylberberg,
chapter 5 of a forthcoming book). This is not a pure coincidence. Equilibrium search models
and eﬃciency wage models belong to the same literature.
The papers by Stevens and Burdett and Coles do not yet fully address the moral hazard
problem, as they do not endogenize worker search eﬀort. They neglect to take into consider-
ation that by nature wage-tenure posted contracts should limit employees search. They thus
certainly overstate the Þrms reaction to employees search on the job. Our contribution can
be understood as an attempt to shed some light on the issue of why and when do Þrms commit
not to match outside oﬀers when search eﬀort is endogenously chosen by employees. It does
not help to understand why Þrms would post wages instead of conditioning wage contracts on
worker states. In wage posting models, indeed, Þrms oﬀer the same wage to all workers, whether
they are employed or not, and whatever employees current wage. Yet, it helps understanding
why Þrms may not want to counter alternative oﬀers made to their employees. We note, how-
ever, that our contribution is not completely general as we do not consider the possibility of
indexing wages on tenure. It therefore stands beside those of Stevens, Burdett and Coles as
one additional piece of argument in the complex discussion of the form of wage contracts in
frictional labor markets.1
We end this discussion of the related literature by one last remark. What makes here
the theory particularly diﬃcult is that in order to understand the eﬀect of search frictions on
wage contracts it is necessary to describe the labor market as a whole, meaning in general
1 It seems that the main focus of this literature is not so much the form of optimal contracts in general than
the form of optimal contracts under certain restrictions. To cite Cahuc and Zyberberg (p. 268, chapter 5), a
general principle of the theory of incentives [...] is that a principal who has at his or her disposal a suﬃciently
wide range of strategies can always make the agents participation constraint binding, and thus appropriate the
entire surplus [...]. The existence of a rent for the agent in a model with moral hazard is thus grounded on
restrictionsthat require explanationon the strategic options of individuals.
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equilibrium. Our contribution is therefore related to the eﬃciency wage literature also by the
fact that market externalities also play an important role (see Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984, and
MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989, 1998).
The paper has 6 Sections besides this Introduction. Section 2 describes the basic economic
environment. Section 3 exposes the wage setting process and describes worker mobility patterns.
Section 4 examines equilibrium Þrm proÞts. Section 5 looks at the equilibrium wage policies
of Þrms according to their types. A series of computed examples is Þnally commented on in
section 6. Section 7 concludes and discusses the main results.
2 The environment
Workers, Þrms and matches. We consider the market for a homogeneous occupation, at a
steady state and on which a unit mass of atomistic workers face a unit mass of competitive Þrms
that produce one unique multi-purpose good. Firms and workers live forever, and discount the
future at rates r and ρ, respectively. As we shall see below, it is not anecdotal that we allow
the discount rate of workers to diﬀer from the one of Þrms.
Workers can either be employed or unemployed, and the unemployment rate of a given
category of labor is denoted by u. The pool of unemployed workers is steadily fueled by job
destructions that occur at the exogenous rate δ. Workers are homogeneous.
All Þrms are endowed with a constant-returns-to-labor technology. The marginal productiv-
ity of labor equals a Þrm-speciÞc constant p. Firms exogenously diﬀer in this productivity para-
meter p. Firm size is limited by search frictions, the existence of which allows low-productivity
Þrms to survive on the market, along with higher-productivity Þrms.
Search frictions. We assume that Þrms and workers are brought together pairwise through
a random and time-consuming search process. SpeciÞcally, unemployed workers sample job
oﬀers sequentially at a Poisson rate λ0. As in the original paper by Burdett and Mortensen
(1998), employees may also search for a better job while employed. The arrival rate of oﬀers
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to on-the-job searchers is (λ1 + s), where s is the endogenous intensity of their search activity.
Search eﬀort s is bounded from above at s and the cost of search is a function c (s) > 0, with
c0 (s) > 0 and c00 (s) ≥ 0. The constant λ1 > 0 is the minimal arrival rate of oﬀers: even
passive workers get oﬀers falling on their lap every now and then. The type (per period output)
p of the Þrm from which a given oﬀer originates is assumed to be randomly selected from the
interval
£
p, p
¤
according to the sampling distribution Γ0 = γ, with a continuous density γ.
Wage setting. We make four fundamental assumptions about the wage setting mechanism:
1. Firms can vary their wage oﬀers according to the characteristics of the particular worker
they meet;
2. Firms can counter the oﬀers received by their employees from competing Þrms;
3. Firms can commit not to match outside oﬀers. They do so ex ante, i.e. before they meet
any worker. Any subsequent deviation from such a commitment is observable by everyone
on the market;
4. Wage contracts are long-term contracts that can be renegotiated by mutual agreement
only.
Assumptions 2 and 3 are important. In particular, as the workers search intensity is en-
dogenous, assumption 3 enables Þrms to induce workers to search less.2 It will turn out in
equilibrium that some Þrms will choose to match oﬀers, while some will choose to commit not
to match oﬀers. We shall denote by γm and γn the unnormalized sampling densities of produc-
tivities of Þrms who do and do not match, respectively. We thus have γm (p)+γn (p) = γ (p) for
all p. We let Γm and Γn denote the associated (defective) cdfs. We denote as m = Γm(p) ≥ 0
2We shall only consider matching strategies of a 0-1 type. Matching strategies where an employer declares
that they will match outsider oﬀer with a probability θ are ruled out by assumption. This restriction will actually
turn out to coincide with the employers optimal strategy under the particular assumption that we are going to
adopt about the workers search behavior (see below for more on this point).
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and n = Γn(p) ≥ 0 respectively the total sampling probabilities of matching and nonmatching
Þrms (with obviously m+ n = 1).
Finally, we use the convention that workers prefer to leave unemployment when they are
oﬀered a wage contract yielding the same present value as the value of unemployment but that
employees prefer not to move when they are oﬀered by a poaching Þrm a wage contract yielding
the same value as their wage in their current Þrm.
3 Worker behavior: wages and search eﬀort
We now exploit the preceding series of assumptions to derive the precise values of the wage
resulting from the various forms of Þrm-worker contacts. From there, we also characterize the
optimal search behavior of workers. The next three sections contain step-by-step derivations of
wages and search eﬀorts. The results are then summarized in section 3.4.
3.1 Wage competition and worker value functions
The lifetime utility of an unemployed is denoted by U0, and that of the same worker when
employed at a Þrm of type p and paid a wage w is Um (w, p) if the Þrm matches alternative
oﬀers, and Un (w, p) if it doesnt. Four distinct situations may occur according to the respective
types of the Þrms that compete over a given worker. We look at the four cases in a sequence.
Employees of nonmatching Þrms. Let us Þrst consider the case of a worker earning w at a
type p nonmatching Þrm, and suppose this worker receives an outside oﬀer from a type q Þrm.
We assume that nonmatching Þrms systematically oﬀer their reservation wage to any worker
that they meet on the search market.3 Therefore, if the type q poacher is a nonmatching
Þrm, then, the incumbent employer having also committed not to match outside oﬀers, the
challenging Þrm oﬀers the worker her reservation wage (plus epsilon) which is equal to w since
3That oﬀering the reservation be the optimal strategy of any nonmatching Þrm is not obvious, and not true in
general, since oﬀering a higher wage may be a means of limiting worker turnover, as in Burdett and Mortensen
(1998). A restriction on the model parameters (notably the sampling distribution γ) is needed for that, and will
be explicited later in the paper. For now, we merely assume that nonmatching Þrms will behave like this in
equilibrium.
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there is no other gain but a greater wage in changing employers. The only restriction on mobility
is that q must be no less than w.
If the poaching Þrm is of the matching type, then it still oﬀers the employee of the non-
matching Þrm their reservation wage (plus epsilon). The novelty here is that the reservation
wage is no longer necessarily equal to w and will be characterized later on.
It follows that an outside oﬀer generates no capital gain to a worker employed at a non-
matching Þrm, the value Un (w, p) of a wage contract w in a non-matching Þrm of productivity
p simply solves the following asset pricing equation:
ρUn (w, p) = w − c (s) + δ · [U0 − Un (w, p)] .
As a result, the optimal search eﬀort when employed at a nonmatching Þrm is obviously 0. We
thus get from the last equation:
Un (w) =
w + δU0
ρ+ δ
, (1)
which has the additional implication that Un (w, p) ≡ Un (w) is independent of p.
Employees of matching Þrms. We now turn to the case of a worker earning w at a type p
matching Þrm, and that receives an oﬀer from a type q Þrm. In this case, the two Þrms enter
a Bertrand game, the winner of which is the Þrm with highest productivity. Such a game was
already analyzed in detail in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a,2002b).
The most simple situation is the one where the worker is paid a wage exactly equal to
her marginal productivity p. It then makes no diﬀerence to the worker whether her employer
matches oﬀers or not because her wage cannot be raised to exceed p anyway. It follows that
the present value of being paid the marginal productivity at a type p matching Þrm is
Um(p, p) =
p+ δU0
ρ+ δ
= Un(p). (2)
Now obviously, Um (p, p) is the highest value that an employee of a type p matching Þrm can
hope to get. It is as high as the incumbent type p employer is able to go in the Bertrand
competition. In other words, it is the reservation value of the worker.
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If the poachers type q is greater than p, then the poacher can aﬀord to oﬀer the worker
a value that strictly exceeds Um (p, p) (for instance Um (q, q) if the poacher is of the matching
type, or Un (q) if it is of the nonmatching type), and therefore wins the Bertrand competition
and attracts the worker. The optimal wage oﬀer made by a matching poacher of type q is
φ (p, q), deÞned by the workers indiﬀerence condition:
Um(p, p) = Um [φ (p, q) , q] . (3)
Likewise, the optimal wage oﬀer made by a nonmatching poacher of type q is the incumbent
employers marginal productivity p (plus epsilon), since Um(p, p) = Un (p).
Now, if the poachers type q is less than p, then it is not able to oﬀer the worker a value
of Um(p, p), since the best it can do is to oﬀer Um(q, q) = Un (q) (depending on its matching
type). The incumbent employer therefore successfully counters the poachers oﬀer by oﬀering
the wage φ (q, p) such that Um [φ (q, p) , p] = Um(q, q) = Un(q).
Naturally, this only entails a wage increase for the worker if the latters previous wage w
was less than φ (q, p). In the opposite case, nothing happens: the poachers best oﬀer is beaten
by the workers statu quo option of staying at Þrm p with a wage w.
To sum up, starting from any wage w, Þrms bid up to the point where the Þrm with
the second highest reservation price (productivity) cannot outbid the one with the highest
productivity.
Second, let q(w, p) be the maximal productivity of an employer from which a Þrm with
productivity p can poach an employee by oﬀering a wage w:
Um [q(w, p), q(w, p)] = Un [q(w, p)] = Um(w, p). (4)
(Note that q(p, p) = p and that φ(q(w, p), p) = w. Knowing the function q(w, p) is thus
equivalent to knowing the function φ(q, p).) With this notation, we can now characterize the
present value of a wage contract w at a matching Þrm of productivity p. Um(w, p) solves the
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following asset value equation:
ρUm (w, p) = w − c (s) + δ · [U0 − Um (w, p)]
+ (λ1 + s) ·
Z p
q(w,p)
[Um (x, x)−Um (w, p)] dΓm (x) + (λ1 + s)Γm (p) [Um (p, p)− Um (w, p)]
+ (λ1 + s) ·
Z p
q(w,p)
[Un (x)− Um (w, p)] dΓn (x) + (λ1 + s)Γn (p) [Un (p)− Um (w, p)] , (5)
where Γ (·) ≡ 1− Γ (·). The right hand side of this equation contains four terms: the instanta-
neous payoﬀ w− c (s), the job destruction risk term δ · [U0 − Um (w, p)], the speciÞc risk related
to drawing an outside oﬀer from a matching Þrm and the speciÞc risk related to drawing an
outside oﬀer from a nonmatching Þrm. In these last two cases, the oﬀer may either result in a
mobility (whenever the poaching Þrms productivity is greater than the incumbents) or not.
We can now replace Un (x) and Um (x, x) by their expressions from (1) and (2) into (5) and
integrate by parts to get:
(ρ+ δ)Um (w, p) = w− c (s) + δU0 + λ1 + s
ρ+ δ
·
Z p
q(w,p)
Γ (x)dx, (6)
Finally, from (4) and (6), we get the following deÞnition of q (w, p):
q (w, p)− λ1 + s (w, p)
ρ+ δ
·
Z p
q(w,p)
Γ (x) dx = w − c [s (w, p)] , (7)
where s (w, p) is the search intensity decided by a worker paid w at a matching Þrm of type p,
which we now look at.
3.2 Search intensity
The optimal search eﬀort of a worker employed at a type (m, p) Þrm earning a wage of w thus
obeys the following rule:
c0 [s (w, p)] ≤ 1
ρ+ δ
·
Z p
q(w,p)
Γ (x)dx and s (w, p) ≤ s, (8)
with equality in one of the two inequalities. The following limiting case will be considered in
the paper: if the marginal cost of search eﬀort is a constant c, workers will put forth the eﬀort
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s if their wage is less than the threshold wage ws (p) solving c =
R p
q(ws(p),p)
Γ (x)dx/ (ρ+ δ),
and will make zero eﬀort as soon as their wage exceeds ws (p). As c becomes inÞnitesimal,
ws (p) → p and all employees of matching Þrms tend to search with the maximal intensity s.
The search intensity is therefore constant across matching Þrms (and equals s in these Þrms),
as well as across nonmatching Þrms (where it equals 0).
3.3 Unemployed workers
We let b denote the constant ßow earnings of an unemployed worker (net of search costs), which
they have to forgo from the moment they Þnd a job. To ensure that all existing Þrm types
are able to hire a positive workforce, it is necessary that the inÞmum of Γs support, p, be no
less than b, for a Þrm less productive than b would never attract any worker. Whenever that
condition is met, any type-p Þrm will want to hire any unemployed worker upon meeting them
on the search market. Since Þrms oﬀer their reservation wages to the unemployed workers they
come in contact with, the latter dont expect any capital gains from their Þrst job. As a result,
U0 simply equals b/ρ.
Obviously, if b is an unconditional level of unemployment income, then unemployed workers
dont have any incentive to put forth any search eﬀort, implying λ0 = λ1. We can circumvent
this restriction by assuming for instance that eligibility for unemployment beneÞts is conditional
on a veriÞable search eﬀort, which ensures an arrival rate of oﬀers of λ0.
Finally, it is straightforward to check that the wage oﬀered to an unemployed worker by a
nonmatching Þrm is exactly equal to b, while that oﬀered by a matching Þrm is equal to:
φ0 (p) = b−
λ1 + s
ρ+ δ
·
Z p
b
Γ (x) dx = φ (b, p) , (9)
which is less than b.
3.4 Summary
We sum up the previous results for all possible cases in table 1. Each row of the table indicates
a diﬀerent worker state (employed/unemployed, employed at a Þrm of productivity p, matching
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Oﬀer arri- Oﬀer coming from a Þrm with
Workers state val rate productivity p0 and matching type n or m
Unemployed λ0
If
p0 > b,
mobility,
no increase
in value
½
if n, w0 = b+
if m, w0 = φ(b, p)+
Earns w at a
non-matching
type p Þrm
λ1
If
p0 ≤ w,
no mobility,
no increase
in value
no wage change
If
p0 > w,
mobility,
no increase
in value
½
if n, no wage change
if m, w0 = φ(w, p0)+ < w
Earns w at a
matching
type p Þrm
λ1+s
If
p0 ≤ q(w, p),
no mobility,
no increase
in value
no wage change
If
q(w, p) < p0 ≤ p,
no mobility,
value
increases
w0= φ(p0, p)+> w
If
p0 > p,
mobility,
value
increases
½
if n, w0 = p+
if m, w0 = φ(p, p0)+ < p
Table 1: Mobility and Wage Setting
or not matching outside oﬀers). The workers state conditions a speciÞc search intensity which
determines the actual job oﬀer arrival rate as displayed in column 2. The third column indicates
which value of the productivity p0 of the Þrm making an oﬀer induces the worker to change
employer. The fourth and last column shows the wage w0 that results from the job oﬀer
according to the respective types of the current employer and the poaching Þrm. Finally, the
functions φ(p, p0) and q(w, p) are deÞned as
φ(p, p0) = p− λ1 + s
ρ+ δ
·
Z p0
p
Γ (x)dx, (10)
q(w, p) = w +
λ1 + s
ρ+ δ
·
Z p
q(w,p)
Γ (x)dx. (11)
In the table, we use a superscript + for w0 to indicate that by convention a Þrm has to oﬀer
strictly more than the reservation wage to make a worker accept the oﬀer (such amount plus
epsilon).
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4 Equilibrium analysis of matching commitments
The objective of this section is to provide some elements of characterization of the Nash equilib-
rium matching commitments, i.e. to address the question of which Þrm types decide to match
outside oﬀers in equilibrium and which Þrms decide to commit not to match. This decision
is obviously based upon the proÞts accruing to the entrepreneur in both cases, which we shall
precisely deÞne and derive in the coming analysis. Before we do so, however, a preliminary char-
acterization of the steady-state distributions of wages and Þrm types across workers is needed.
This is what the following paragraph is about.
4.1 Steady-state worker and wage distributions
Even without knowing which Þrm types choose to match and which dont in equilibrium, we
can deÞne `n (p) as the steady-state equilibrium unnormalized density of nonmatching Þrm
productivities across employed workers. In other words, `n (p) equals the steady-state measure of
workers employed at type p nonmatching Þrms. We can further deÞne Gn (w|p) (resp. gn (w|p))
the cdf (resp. density) of wages in the population of such workers. Likewise, we introduce
similar deÞnitions for matching Þrms: `m (p) and Gm (w|p) (resp. gm (w|p)). The following
Proposition characterizes those four distributions.4
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium wage and productivity distributions) Let ϕm (p) and ϕn (p)
be the pair of functions solving the system of diﬀerential equations:¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
ϕ0m (p)
ϕm (p)
=
λ1 + s
δ + (λ1 + s)Γ (p)
·
µ
γ (p) +
δ + λ1Γ (p)
δ + λ1Γm (p)
· γm (p)
¶
ϕ0n (p) = (λ1 + s)
ϕm (p)γm (p)
δ + λ1Γm (p)
(12)
4Again, the densities `m and `n are not normalized, and we have:Z p
p
[`m (x) + `n (x)] dx = 1− u.
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over
£
p, p
¤
with initial conditions¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
ϕm
¡
p
¢
=
λ0u (δ + λ1)
(δ + λ1 + s) (δ + λ1m)
ϕn
¡
p
¢
=
λ0u
δ + λ1m
. (13)
Then:
1. For all p, the distribution of wages in matching Þrms with productivity p has support
included in {φ0(p)} ∪ (φ(p, p), p]. The cdf of wages within these Þrms is such that
Gm (φ0(p)|p) `m (p) =
λ0u
δ + λ1 + s
γm (p) , (14)
and
Gm (w|p) `m (p) = ϕm [q (w, p)] γm (p) , (15)
over (φ(p, p), p].
2. For all p, the distribution of wages across employees of nonmatching Þrms with produc-
tivity p has support included in [b, b+ ε) ∪ (p, p].5 The corresponding cdf is such that
Gn (b|p) `n (p) = λ0u
δ + λ1
γn (p) , (16)
and
Gn (w|p) `n (p) = ϕn (w) γn (p) , (17)
over (p, p].
3. Finally, for all p, the densities of Þrm types across employed workers `m (p) and `n (p)
are deÞned by:
`m (p) = ϕm (p) γm (p) (18)
and
`n (p) = ϕn (p) γn (p) . (19)
5With ε an arbitrarily small positive real number.
13
The proof of this Proposition is conÞned to the Appendix. It mainly rests on the various
Þrm- and worker-level ßow-balance equations implied by the steady-state assumption.
The contents of this Proposition are essentially technical and will be used in the simulations
below. Two things are worth emphasizing, however. First, while `m (p) and `n (p) represent
the densities of workers employed at Þrms of types (m, p) and (n, p) respectively, the functions
ϕm (p) and ϕn (p) are interpreted as the (mean) sizes of such Þrms.
Second, the Proposition formalizes the intuition that wage dispersion degenerates to an
atom at the monopsony wage b on a market where all Þrms choose the nonmatching strategy.6
Intuitively, there is no reason indeed why wages would ever depart from b on a market where no
Þrm responds to the outside job oﬀers received by their workers. Unemployed workers are hired
by any of those nonmatching Þrms at a wage equal to b, and employed workers are successfully
poached by competitors oﬀering a wage equal to b plus an inÞnitesimal amount.
Contrary to what happens in the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) world, on-the-job search
and between-Þrm competition for hiring and retaining workers does not entail any equilibrium
wage dispersion among ex-ante similar workers in this case. Even though we havent explicitly
modelled it here, the only potential source of wage dispersion in a situation like this is het-
erogeneity in the unemployed workers reservation wages, as described by Albrecht and Axell
(1984) and Albrecht and Vroman (2001).
Now, in the general case where some Þrm types choose to match oﬀers and some choose not
to, Proposition 1 predicts non degenerate within- and between-Þrms wage distributions, the
shape of which in turn depend on which Þrm types choose to match oﬀers and which choose
not to. This is the question addressed in the following paragraphs.
6Proof of this claim: Since in that situation we have γm (p) = 0 for all p, system (12) implies that ϕn (p)
remains constant over
£
p, p
¤
. Using this constancy property in (17) and (19) then shows that Gn (w|p) ≡ 1 for
all (w, p) with b < w ≤ p.
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4.2 Firm behavior
As we already argued, the decision of whether to match or not to match oﬀers hinges on the
comparison between the ex-ante proÞts made under either strategyi.e. the expected proÞts
at the time when the commitment is made, which is before any worker is hired by the Þrm.
What we have to do Þrst is therefore to come up with a deÞnition and of course an expression
of those ex-ante proÞts.
We follow Mortensen (2002) in our speciÞcation of Þrm behavior by assuming that Þrms
maximize expected proÞt per contacted worker.7 This quantity has two components: the expected
present discounted value of a job occupied by a worker paid some wage w, and the density of
wages accepted by contacted workers. The next two paragraphs looks at the former (under both
matching strategies), and the paragraph after that determines the latter and Þnally derives the
criterion that entrepreneurs maximize when they choose either to match or not to match oﬀers.
The following notation is adopted for the rest of the paper: The discounted sum of future
expected proÞt ßows from a Þlled job at a Þrm with productivity p and matching type m (n)
that pays a current wage of w is designated by Jm (w, p) (Jn (w, p)).
Value of a Þlled job to a matching Þrm: Jm (w, p). In order to write down the Bellman
equations characterizing Jm (w, p), we should remember two things: Þrst, Þrms discount the
future at rate r, possibly diﬀerent from the workers ρ, and second, matching commitments are
assumed to hold through the entire lifetime of a job. With that in mind, the results established
7Much of the job search literature follows the initial assumption of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) that Þrms
maximize their steady-state proÞt ßows. As those two authors have emphasized, both criteria are equivalent if
one assumes that Þrms dont discount the future, i.e. if one assumes r = 0. We do not want to make this
assumption in the present analysis, as we shall see that the diﬀerence between r and ρi.e. the Þrms and the
workers discount ratesplays an interesting role in equilibrium determination. This result would be obliterated
if we forced r = 0. Treatment of the moral hazard problem analyzed in this paper in the context of the original
Burdett and Mortensen assumption was carried out by us in an earlier version of this paper, which is available
upon request.
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in the previous sections directly imply that, for any (w, p) with q = q (w, p):
©
r + δ + (λ1 + s)Γ [q (w, p)]
ª
Jm (w, p) = p−w + (λ1 + s)
Z p
q(w,p)
Jm [φ (x, p) , p] dΓ (x)
m©
r + δ + (λ1 + s)Γ (q)
ª
Jm [φ (q, p) , p] = p− φ (q, p) + (λ1 + s)
Z p
q
Jm [φ (x, p) , p] dΓ (x) .
Take the Þrst line in the above equation. (p−w) is the proÞt ßow accruing to the type p Þrm
from a job paying a wage w. In addition, the worker leaves the match (either to unemployment
or to a more attractive job) with instantaneous probability
£
δ + (λ1 + s)Γ (p)
¤
, thus leaving the
Þrm with zero residual value. Finally, with a probability ßow of (λ1 + s) {Γ (p)− Γ [q (w, p)]},
the worker receives an outside oﬀer from a Þrm with type within [q (w, p) , p], which the em-
ployer successfully counters. The latter thus loses the value Jm (w, p), and recovers a job worth
Jm [φ (x, p) , p], where x is the unsuccessful poachers type. Integrating over [q (w, p) , p] and
adding those three terms, we get the above Bellman equation.
Diﬀerentiation w.r.t. q of the last deÞnition of Jm [φ (q, p) , p] shows that:
∂
∂q
{Jm [φ (q, p) , p]} = − 1
ρ+ δ
· ρ+ δ + (λ1 + s)Γ (q)
r + δ + (λ1 + s)Γ (q)
,
which can be integrated to Þnally yield:8
Jm [φ (q, p) , p] =
1
ρ+ δ
Z p
q
ρ+ δ + (λ1 + s)Γ (x)
r + δ + (λ1 + s)Γ (x)
dx. (20)
Note in passing that this expression becomes remarkably simple in the special case where
workers and Þrms have equal discount rates (r = ρ).
Value of a Þlled job to a nonmatching Þrm: Jn (w, p). The value of a nonmatching job,
Jn (w, p), is much simpler to characterize as the worker leaves the job upon receiving an oﬀer
from any Þrm whose productivity exceeds their current wage. As a consequence,
£
r + δ + λ1Γ (w)
¤
Jn (w, p) = p−w. (21)
8This uses the fact that Jm (p, p) = 0.
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Comparing with the initial Bellman equation for Jm (w, p), we see that outside oﬀers are more
likely to cause the worker to leave the Þrm in the nonmatching case, with the counteracting
advantage that such oﬀers are less frequent in that case (rate λ1 instead of λ1+s), since workers
have no incentive to incur the cost of active search.9
Expected proÞts per worker contacted. Matching commitments are made ex ante, i.e.
they are posted together with the job oﬀer. Thus, to make its decision of whether to match
or not to match outside oﬀers, a Þrm does not only compare the Þlled job values Jn and Jm,
but rather the corresponding expected values of contacting a potential job applicant, πm and
πn.
The number (measure) of workers contacted by a type p Þrm per unit time is given by
nc · γ (p) where:
nc · γ (p) =
(
λ0u+ (λ1 + s)
Z p
p
`m (x)dx+ λ1
Z p
p
`n (x) dx
)
· γ (p) .
The Þrst term in curly brackets is the number of contacted unemployed workers, the second
term counts employed job seekers from matching Þrms, and the third corresponds to employed
job seekers from nonmatching Þrms. The constant nc is the average number of contacts per
Þrm and unit of time.
Let us Þrst consider the expected value of contacting a worker for a matching Þrm of type p,
which we denote as πm (p). Since the origin of future applicants (i.e. their wage and incumbent
9Now that the value Jn (w, p) is deÞned, we can return to the question of a nonmatching Þrms optimal wage
oﬀer policy (see foonote 3). Given its precommitment not to respond to poachers, a nonmatching Þrm might
indeed Þnd it more proÞtable to oﬀer more than its applicants reservation wages to reduce the chance that its
worker leaves to a better paying Þrm, i.e. to limit its turnover. Clearly, equation (21) alone does not imply that
∂Jn/∂w < 0 for all (w, p), as:
∂Jn
∂w
(w, p) =
(p− w)λ1γ (w)−
£
r + δ + λ1Γ (w)
¤£
r + δ + λ1Γ (w)
¤2 .
We thus have to impose the additional restriction on Γ that for all (p,w) with w < p:
(p−w)λ1γ (w) < r + δ + λ1Γ (w) .
This restriction ensures that if all nonmatching Þrms implement the same minimal wage oﬀer policy, then it
is optimal for the marginal nonmatching Þrm to do so as well, i.e. this reservation wage policy is an equilibrium
strategy.
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employers type) is not known in advance to a Þrm, the latter has to integrate over all possible
origins. Accordingly, the expected value of meeting an applicant solves:
πm (p) =
λ0u
nc
Jm [φ (b, p) , p] +
λ1 + s
nc
Z p
p
Jm [φ (q, p) , p] `m (q)dq
+
λ1
nc
ÃZ p
p
Jm [φ (w, p) , p]
Z p
w
gn (w|q) `n (q) dqdw + Jm [φ (b, p) , p]
Z p
p
Gn
¡
p|q¢ `n (q)dq! ,
The Þrst term in the above equation corresponds to the case where the Þrm contacts an un-
employed worker. This happens with probability λ0u/nc and the corresponding oﬀered wage is
the unemployed workers reservation wage for working at a type p-matching Þrm φ (b, p), which
was determined in the last section (equation (9) and Table 1). The second term is the expected
value of a contact with an employee of a matching Þrm. The ßow probability of meeting an em-
ployee of a type q matching Þrm is equal to (λ1 + s) `m (q) /nc. The oﬀer needed to attract such
a worker is φ (q, p), hence the corresponding job value Jm [φ (q, p) , p]. Attracting the worker
is only possible if q ≤ p, which deÞnes the bounds of the integral in the second term above.
The last term gives the expected value of an application from an employee of a nonmatching
Þrm. The probability with which an employee of a type q nonmatching Þrm earning a wage w
is met equals to λ1gn (w|q) `n (q) /nc (employees of nonmatching Þrms search less intensively).
The oﬀer needed to attract such a worker is a function φ (w, p) of their current wage w (see
Table 1 again), thus yielding the value Jm [φ (w, p) , p]. The feasible (w, p) pairs are deÞned by
w ≤ p (otherwise the type p Þrm is not able to attract the worker), and w ≤ q (the worker
obviously earns less than their current marginal productivity). Hence the integral in the third
term above.
Using the results of Proposition 1, the above expression can be transformed into:
πm (p) =
λ0u
nc
(δ + λ1)
δ + λ1m
Jm [φ (b, p) , p]
+
λ1 + s
nc
Z p
p
δ + λ1Γ (q)
δ + λ1Γm (q)
Jm [φ (w, p) , p]ϕm(q)γm (q) dq. (22)
18
Similarly, for nonmatching Þrms:
πn (p) =
λ0u
nc
(δ + λ1)
δ + λ1m
Jn (b, p) +
λ1 + s
nc
Z p
p
δ + λ1Γ (q)
δ + λ1Γm (q)
Jn (q, p)ϕm(q)γm (q)dq. (23)
This expression is exactly similar to (22), with Jm [φ (w, p) , p] changed into Jn (q, p). Clearly,
the meeting rates of all types of workers are equal in both cases, and the only thing that
diﬀers between the matching and nonmatching strategies is the wage that has to be oﬀered to
attract a worker. As is summarized in Table 1, nonmatching Þrms meeting the employee of a
matching Þrm must oﬀer the incumbent jobs marginal productivity q (as opposed to φ (q, p) in
the matching case), and a nonmatching Þrm meeting the employee of another nonmatching Þrm
simply oﬀers the workers current wage w plus epsilon (as opposed to φ (w, p) in the matching
case). Hence the correspondence between equations (22) and (23).
4.3 Matching commitments
The correspondence between Þrm types and matching commitments hinges on the sign of the
diﬀerence between the above two values. SpeciÞcally, what we have to look at is ∆π (p) =
πm (p) − πn (p): Þrm types for which this diﬀerence is positive (negative) in equilibrium will
choose to match (not to match) oﬀers.
Taking the diﬀerence between (22) and (23), we obtain the following:
nc ·∆π (p) = λ0u (δ + λ1)
δ + λ1m
∆J (b, p) + (λ1 + s)
Z p
p
δ + λ1Γ (q)
δ + λ1Γm (q)
∆J (q, p)ϕm(q)γm (q)dq, (24)
where we deÞne ∆J (q, p) as Jm [φ (q, p) , p]− Jn (q, p). Using (20) and (21), we thus get:
∆J (q, p) =
Z p
q
λ1Γ (q)
£
ρ+ δ + (λ1 + s)Γ (x)
¤− (ρ− r) (λ1 + s)Γ (x)
(ρ+ δ)
£
r + δ + (λ1 + s)Γ (x)
¤ £
r + δ + λ1Γ (q)
¤ dx. (25)
The rest of the paper will thus be devoted to examining the sign of the right hand side of (24).
5 Equilibrium properties
5.1 A Þrst set of equilibrium properties
Segmentation. Equations (24) and (25) have important immediate implications. The Þrst
one is that, under the assumption of a continuous density γ (·), the function p 7→ ∆π (p)
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is continuous over the productivity interval
£
p, p
¤
. This implies that in equilibrium, the set
of Þrm productivity levels
£
p, p
¤
can be divided into a sequence of adjacent intervals, say
{[pi, pi+1] ; i = 0, . . . , I}, where p0 = p, pI = p, and where if Þrms with productivity lev-
els within [pi, pi+1] choose e.g. to match oﬀers, then Þrms with productivity levels within
[pi+1, pi+2] choose not to match oﬀers (and vice-versa). In the sequel, we shall refer to pro-
ductivity intervals where Þrms match oﬀers as matching segments, and to intervals where Þrms
choose not to match oﬀers as nonmatching segments. Note that γm (p) = γ (p), γn (p) = 0 over
any matching segment, while γm (p) = 0, γn (p) = γ (p) over any nonmatching segment. This
property is helpful for solving the system of diﬀerential equations (12) in Proposition 1 (see the
Appendix).
Simple suﬃcient conditions. The second important implication is that a suﬃcient condi-
tion for all Þrm types to be willing to match oﬀers in equilibrium is that workers be at least
as patient as Þrms are (ρ ≤ r). In that case, equation (25) shows that ∆J (q, p) ≥ 0 for all
(q, p), which together with (24) implies that ∆π (p) ≥ 0 for all p. Relatively patient workers
are inclined to trade low wages today for higher wages in the future, and it takes smaller wage
increases to retain them, as appears from the deÞnition of the mobility wage (10). This clearly
makes oﬀer-matching more attractive an option for Þrms. Note that the above suﬃcient con-
dition admits the limiting case where Þrms and workers have equal discount rate. Standard
though it may be, this assumption nonetheless appears to be somewhat unrealistic. Estima-
tions of this model under the assumption that all Þrms prefer to match oﬀers were conducted
by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b), who found values of ρ− r ranging from 30 to 55% annual
discount (depending on the category of labor considered).10
A third, more intuitive implication is that all Þrm types choose to match oﬀers in equilibrium
10Also, as we already noted, another common practice is to follow Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and assume
that Þrms maximize their steady-state proÞt ßows, which amounts to assuming that r = 0. Clearly in this case,
the suﬃcient condition is unlikely to be satisÞed.
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in the limiting case where s → 0.11 It then makes no diﬀerence to the Þrm whether workers
search actively or not and the moral hazard problem vanishes. It is then obviously always
optimal to adopt the matching behavior, as matching oﬀers becomes costless. Conversely, as
λ1 → 0, keeping a positive s, all Þrms tend to Þnd the nonmatching option more proÞtable
whenever ρ ≥ r.12
5.2 What low-p Þrms do in equilibrium.
Under what condition all Þrms with productivity less than a given value p optimally decide
not to match outside oﬀers? Examination of equations (24) and (25) lead to the following
statement:
Proposition 2 Let pn ∈
£
p, p
¤
. In equilibrium, all Þrms with productivity p ≤ pn prefer not to
match outside oﬀers if and only ifZ pn
b
(ρ− r − λ1) (λ1 + s)Γ (x)− λ1 (ρ+ δ)
r + δ + (λ1 + s)Γ (x)
dx > 0. (26)
m
∆J (b, pn) < 0.
The Appendix contains a formal proof of this Proposition. The intuition, however, is clear
enough. As we saw from Proposition 1, if all Þrms with productivity within some interval£
p, pn
¤
choose the nonmatching strategy, then the wage distribution among the employees of
those Þrms degenerates to a mass point at the monopsony wage, b. As a consequence, the only
term that counts in the comparison of ex-ante job values ∆π (q) (equation (24)), is ∆J (b, p).
Condition (26) ensures that this term be negative for all p in
£
p, pn
¤
.
11Proof of this claim: The numerator of the integrand in (25) can be rewritten as
ρ
£
λ1Γ (q)− (λ1 + s)Γ (x)
¤
+ λ1Γ (q)
£
δ + (λ1 + s)Γ (x)
¤
+ r (λ1 + s)Γ (x) ,
which, as x ≥ q ⇒ Γ (x) ≤ Γ (q), is clearly positive when s = 0. This in turn makes ∆J (q, p) positive for all
(q, p). Hence the positive sign of ∆π (p) for all p.
12Remark that in theadmittedly unrealisticcase where Þrms are less patient than workers (ρ < r), then all
Þrms prefer to match oﬀer even if λ1 = 0, i.e. even if passive workers never get any job oﬀers. Intuitively, Þrms
can charge very high entry fees to very patient workers in the form of low initial wages in exchange for higher
wages in the future. This kind of low-intercept, high-slope wage proÞle is more attractive to relatively impatient
entrepreneurs than the ßat proÞles implied by the nonmatching strategy.
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Note that Proposition 2 implies that the least productive Þrms (those with productivity p)
choose not to match outside oﬀers if and only if
(ρ− r − λ1) s > λ1 (r + δ + λ1) . (27)
This condition is interesting because it becomes necessary and suﬃcient as Γ (·) degenerates
to a mass at p. It thus fully characterizes the equilibrium of a homogeneous Þrm model. A
point worth noting about this result is the following: parameter conÞgurations exist where the
unique Þrm type prefers to match outside oﬀers in the homogeneous modelit is the case when
(27) is violated. In this situation, workers are induced to actively search on-the-job. As Þrms
are homogeneous, such employed job search is a pure rent-seeking activity that has no social
value. This clearly exhibits the ineﬃciencies associated with the strategic aspects of employed
job search.
Note also that the integrand in (26) is decreasing and negative in the vicinity of x = p.
Proposition 2 therefore states that for a given set of parameters ρ, r, δ, λ1 and s the right tail
of the distribution of productivities must not be too long (small enough kurtosis) for all Þrms
to be of the nonmatching type in equilibrium. As typically wage distributions have long tails
and estimated distributions of productivities even longer tails, it is thus unlikely that condition
(26) be veriÞed over the entire support of the distribution of productivities.
More generally, Proposition 2 suggests that high-productivity Þrms have an intrinsic ad-
vantage in adopting the matching behavior. Intuitively, this is because the cost for high-
productivity Þrms in terms of wage increase of responding to the oﬀers received by their work-
ers from low-p Þrms is relatively small as a share of total proÞts per job for two reasons: The
average wage increase needed to retain their worker is relatively small as a share of the proÞt
ßow for high-p Þrms, and the high-p Þrms are also more likely to be successful in countering
the outside oﬀers received by their workers.
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δ λ1 + s ρ r
.1 .7 .3 0
Table 2: Baseline parameter values (annual)
5.3 Further equilibrium characterization.
Equations (24) and (25), together with system (12), the solution of which is explicited in the
Appendix, allow in principle to derive the exact condition for ∆π(p) > 0 for all p ∈ £p, p¤,
just as we did in Proposition 2 for the left end of this interval. Unfortunately, all parameters
and the distribution of productivities interact in this condition in a very intricate way which
makes it diﬃcult to get any clear intuition about the separate inßuence of each parameter. This
condition is therefore pretty useless, save for simulating the model, which we now do.
6 Computed examples
A calibration. This section contains a series of computed examples of our model labor mar-
ket, showing that a large variety of patterns can be observed in equilibrium. A similar model
was estimated on French data by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b) under the assumption that
all Þrms match oﬀers in equilibrium. The estimations were conducted separately for seven cat-
egories of workers. Even though the estimates vary a bit across worker categories, the set of
values gathered in Table 2 can be considered reasonable as a rough baseline calibration of the
model.13 Because of the assumption that all Þrms match oﬀers, the arrival rate of oﬀers actually
estimated in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b) is λ1 + s, not λ1. What remains undetermined
here is the relative value of λ1 and s. We shall therefore examine a series of diﬀerent values.
Finally, we simulate the model under the limiting assumption that p = b.14
13The value of the discount rate ρ reported in Table 2 may seem quite high. In fact, Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002b) found values between .35 (executives and managers) and .80 (unskilled manual workers), under the
assumption of a linear instantaneous utility function with r = 0. The latter assumption is relatively innocuous,
as what really counts in the proÞt diﬀerential ∆π (p) is the discount rate diﬀerential, r − ρ.
14The estimates in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b) indicate that p > b. However, the estimated gap between
p and b is relatively small compared to the range of Þrm productivities, p− p.
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Baseline cases. We start with an agnostic assumption about productivity dispersion in this
Þrst series of simulations, i.e. we assume that oﬀers are uniformly sampled from
£
p, p
¤
= [1, 2].15
Figures 1 to 3 plot the relative gain of matching oﬀers ∆π (p) /πn (p) against p for values of
s corresponding to active searchers receiving oﬀers 3, 4, and 7 times more frequently than
passive workers, respectively. The necessary condition (27) is met in the last two cases only.
<Figures 1, 2 and 3 about here>
We see from Figure 1 that the Þrst case is an all Þrms match equilibrium: ∆π (p) is
positive at all productivity levels. As the eﬀectiveness of active search (s) increase (Figs. 2
and 3), the equilibrium moves to a situation where low-productivity Þrms choose not to match
oﬀers, while high-productivity Þrms match oﬀers (the percentage of nonmatching Þrms in the
case of Figure 2 equals 37%). We thus observe a dual labor market in this case, with bad
jobs at low-productivity Þrms that only oﬀer b as a wage with no within-Þrm career prospects,
and good jobs at more productive Þrms that try to retain their workers from being poached
by their competitors. Finally, as s increases, it becomes too costly for any Þrm type to match
and we end up in a no Þrm matches equilibrium with an earnings distribution that collapses
to an atom at b and no job-to-job turnover.
It is obvious from all three Figures that it is relatively more beneÞcial for high-productivity
Þrms than for low-productivity Þrms to match outside oﬀers, which conÞrms the intuition that
we had from the previous section. This advantage of high-p Þrms in matching, however, also
depends on the assumed shape of the sampling distribution of productivities, as we now show.
Firm concentration and wage policy. We now take a brief look at how the shape of the
productivity distribution aﬀects the equilibrium. We start from the situation of Figure 2 above,
where good (matching) and bad (nonmatching) Þrms coexist on the market. The cutoﬀ
15A uniform γ over [1, 2], together with the adopted parameter values, is compatible with the necessary
condition that appears in footnote 9, which ensures that nonmatching Þrms oﬀer their reservation wages to every
worker they meet.
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productivity between good and bad Þrms turns out to be pc = 1.37 with the chosen calibration
(Þrms less productive than pc = 1.37 choosing the nonmatching behavior). We then look at
changes in the concentration of good and bad Þrms, and see how it changes the equilibrium
strategies.
<Figures 4 to 7 about here>
Figure 5 exempliÞes a situation where there is a relatively high concentration of bad Þrms,
the initially uniform sampling density γ (·) being changed to the mixture of uniforms depicted
on Figure 4. (The new γ (p) is equal to
.55×I{p≤p≤pc}
pc−p +
.45×I{pc≤p≤p}
p−pc . All other parameters
keep the same value as on Figure 2.) What we see from Figure 5 is that some Þrms with
productivities below pc, which used not to match oﬀers in the uniform case, now switch to the
matching strategy (the new cutoﬀ productivity being p0c ' 1.25 in this new example). This is
obviously driven by new the shape of the productivity sampling density γ (·), which is now more
concentrated at low values of p. Firms with high ps are consequently more isolated, in the
sense that the chances for one of their workers to contact a Þrm with a comparable or higher
productivity are more limited. The cost to those Þrms of high oﬀer arrival rates is therefore
limited as well, since their workers are relatively more likely to contact unattractive poachers,
thus only costing a modest or even no wage increase.16
This feature can obviously change somewhat as the shape of γ (·) is altered. Figure 7 depicts
the converse case, where high-p oﬀers are relatively more frequent (the corresponding sampling
density being plotted on Figure 6). The result of this shift in the sampling density exactly
mirrors that obtained on Figure 5: some jobs more productive than pc now Þnd it optimal not
to match oﬀers, whereas they chose the matching behavior in the benchmark case of a uniform
sampling density.
16Note that, although the productivity range over which Þrms prefer not to match oﬀers is clearly narrowed
toward p, nothing general can be said about the total equilibrium share of nonmatching Þrms on the market, as
the density of Þrms with low ps is also increased. It turns out in the example that this share is slightly higher
in the case of Figure 5 (37.42%) than in that of Figure 2 (37%).
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As we already argued, a typical estimation of the productivity density in a job search model
like the one presented in this paper would be steeply decreasing at low productivities, with a
relatively long tail (see e.g. Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002b). This is best proxied by the case
depicted on Figure 5, where γ (·) is concentrated at low productivities.17 As a conclusion, even
though the model leaves room for virtually any equilibrium pattern of matching commitments
across Þrm types, it nonetheless strongly suggests that a plausible situation would be one
where the labor market is dual, with bad jobs at low-p, nonmatching Þrms, and good jobs
at high-p, matching Þrms that oﬀer upward sloping career paths.
7 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper we have addressed the issue of a Þrms optimal wage policy when employed workers
can strategically use the search for outside job oﬀers to put employers into competition, thus
forcing the latter to raise their wages. SpeciÞcally, we show that it may be proÞtable for some
Þrms to refuse competition, i.e. to ex ante commit not to match the outside job oﬀers received
by their employees, even when it is ex post optimal to match those oﬀers.
Even though general equilibrium characterization is rather complicated in this context, we
are able to derive suﬃcient conditions for the equilibrium to be of the sort all Þrms match or
no Þrm matches. More importantly, we Þnd that matching and nonmatching Þrms generically
coexist in equilibrium. We argue in fact from calibrated examples that a plausible situation is
one where the labor market is dual, with bad jobs at low-productivity, nonmatching Þrms
oﬀering stagnant within-Þrm career proÞles and good jobs at high-productivity, matching
Þrms in which wage-tenure proÞles are (on average) upward sloping.
Our results should be qualiÞed by the following series of remarks, which we also view as
ideas to be pursued in future research. Firstly, an issue that we do not address in the paper
is the nature of the commitment device that could be available for nonmatching Þrms to use.
17A simulation with a more realistic density γ (·)e.g. a Paretois naturally possible (available upon
request), and delivers a picture which is qualitatively similar to Figure 5.
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Clearly, reputation eﬀects have to be the answer. If an employer claiming to be nonmatching
were to renege on its initial commitment as one of its employees receives an outside job oﬀer,
then if the rest of its employees can observe the deviation, one would expect them to start
searching actively, which would negatively aﬀect the employers proÞt.
Secondly, some of our results depend on the restrictions that we impose on equilibrium.
Some of those restrictions are merely conditions on the parameters (see footnote 9) ensuring
that the situation we look at is an equilibrium. Others are more fundamental restrictions on the
class of equilibria considered: in particular, we do not allow Þrms to pursue more sophisticated
wages policies, such as pre-commiting to unconditional tenure-dependent wage proÞles (as in
Stevens, 2000, or Burdett and Coles, 2001) or simply to the same ßat, unconditional wage proÞle
for every worker (as in the original Burdett and Mortensen model). In the particular context
of our model we can always argue that, from the Þrms point of view, such wage-posting
behavior never beats the oﬀer-matching strategy, since workers hired at nonmatching, wage-
posting Þrms would still have an incentive to search actively in the hope to Þnd a better posted
oﬀer which would strictly increase their value function. However, this argument is only valid
under the restriction that the workers choice of a search eﬀort is essentially 0/1, i.e. to either
search actively or not at all. In the more general case where eﬀort is a continuous variable,
then the Þrms arbitrage would be less simple, and the result less clear-cut.18 Unfortunately,
mathematical tractability limits the possibility that we have to address those questions more
formally in the context of this particular model. Hopefully, more satisfactory answers will come
in the future as the output of further research.
A Þnal issue that was only quickly mentioned in the paper19 is that of social eﬃciency.
Even though it may be proÞt-increasing for some private Þrms, the strategy of matching oﬀers
encourages employed job search as a rent-seeking activity. Since not all employer-worker contact
18Other strong assumptions could be changed in a way that would alter the results, e.g. that of complete
information and perfect veriÞablility of outside oﬀers.
19See the discussion of equation (27) in Section 5.2.
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have positive social value, the decentralized equilibrium of our model economy probably features
excessive employed job search and excessive job-to-job worker reallocation. However, a proper
assessment of eﬃciency would require a careful modelling of labor demand, again something
that we leave to future research.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
In a steady-state, outßows of workers leaving an employment stock because of lay-oﬀ or poaching are
exactly compensated by corresponding inßows of workers coming either from unemployment or poached
from other Þrms.
Nonmatching Þrms. Let us Þrst consider the distribution of wages within nonmatching Þrms.
Unemployed workers are oﬀered a wage equal to b by those Þrms. If all Þrms were nonmatching there
would be no reason why wages would ever depart from b. A nonmatching Þrm poaching a worker paid
b in another nonmatching Þrm would attract the worker for b plus an inÞnitesimal amount (say b+).
Conversely, a nonmatching Þrm poaching the employee of a matching Þrm would attract the worker
by oﬀering their marginal productivity in that matching Þrm. It follows that in general the support of
wages in a nonmatching Þrm of productivity p should be a subset of {b} ∪ (p, p].
In any such Þrm there is a mass Gn (b|p) `n (p) of employees paid b. In order to maintain that stock
constant, it must be the case that
(δ + λ1)Gn (b|p) `n (p) = λ0uγn (p) .
The fraction (δ + λ1)Gn (b|p) `n (p) of employees of Þrms with productivity p paid b leaving the stock
is equal to the fraction of the unemployed population u who are contacted by a Þrm of type p, which
occurs with probability λ0γn (p).
Next, consider the stock of employees paid a wage w in (p, p]. The steady-state outßow is the fraction
δ who is laid oﬀ plus the fraction λ1Γ (w) who gets a better oﬀer from a competing Þrm. The inßow
is entirely made of workers who have been poached out of other Þrms. Equating inßows and outßows
yields £
δ + λ1Γ (w)
¤
gn (w|p) `n (p) =
"
(λ1 + s) · `m (w) + λ1 ·
Z p
w
gn (w|x) `n (x) dx
#
γn (p) (28)
since only the workers of a matching Þrm of productivity w are poached by a nonmatching Þrm of
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productivity p at wage w+, and since all workers paid w in a non matching Þrm of any productivity
x ≥ w are poached by a nonmatching Þrm of productivity p at wage w+.
Note that equation (28) implies that gn (w|p) `n (p) has the form ϕ0n (w) ·γn (p), where ϕ0n (w) is some
continuous function of w, and is independent of p. As Gn (b|p) `n (p) = λ0uγn (p) / (δ + λ1) also has that
same form, it follows that
Gn (w|p) `n (p) =
Z w
b
gn (x|p) `n (p) dx+Gn (b|p) `n (p) = ϕn (w) · γn (p) .
The function ϕn (·) is thus an increasing function, the same for all p. Since we also know thatGn (p|p) = 1,
it must be the case that ϕn (p) · γn (p) = `n (p) for all p such that γn (p) 6= 0.
We Þnally turn to the initial value of ϕn, i.e. ϕn
¡
p
¢
. There is a measure Gn
¡
p|p¢ `n (p) of employees
paid less than p by nonmatching Þrms of type p. Equating inßows and outßows for this stock yields:
(δ + λ1)Gn
¡
p|p¢ `n (p) = "λ0u+ λ1 Z p
p
Gn
¡
p|x¢ `n (x) dx# γn (p) .
The reasoning here is exactly similar to the one that yielded Gn (b|p) `n (p). Only here, a fraction λ1γn (p)
of all workers employed at nonmatching Þrms at a wage less than p has to be added to the inßow. The
latter are indeed willing to move to a diﬀerent nonmatching Þrm for an oﬀer only inÞnitesimally more
generous than their current wage, which is still less than p. Solving for ϕn
¡
p
¢
in the last equation gives
the second equation in (13).
Matching Þrms. Matching Þrms with productivity p attract unemployed workers by oﬀering their
reservation wage φ0(p) = φ(b, p). They poach employees paid w at nonmatching Þrms by oﬀering them
φ(w, p) and employees of matching Þrms with productivity q < p by oﬀering them φ(q, p). Since wages
in nonmatching Þrms are in the set {b}∪ (p, p] it follows that wages in matching Þrms with productivity
p belong to the set
{φ(b, p)} ∪ (φ(p, p),φ(p, p)] = {φ0(p)} ∪ (φ(p, p), p].
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Equating inßows and outßows for the stocks Gm (w|p) `m (p) in matching Þrms of productivity p yields:
©
δ + (λ1 + s) · Γ [q (w, p)]
ª ·Gm (w|p) `m (p)
=
"
λ0u+ (λ1 + s) ·
Z q(w,p)−
p
`m (x) dx+ λ1 ·
Z p
p
Gn
h
q (w, p)− |x
i
`n (x) dx
#
· γm (p) . (29)
The LHS is the outßow: a fraction is laid oﬀ and all workers paid less than w in a matching Þrm
of productivity p accept a job in another Þrm (matching or nonmatching) if its productivity exceeds
q(w, p). The RHS is the inßow: a fraction comes from the unemployment stock; another fraction
comprises former employees of matching Þrms with productivity less than q(w, p);20 the last share is
made of former employees of all nonmatching Þrms who were paid less than q(w, p).
This equation implies that Gm (w|p) `m (p) has the form ϕm [q(w, p)] · γm (p). Setting w = p, which
implies q(w, p) = q(p, p) = p and Gm (w|p) = Gm (p|p) = 1, we Þnally get that `m (p) = ϕm (p) · γm (p)
for all p.
Finally turning to the initial conditions, it is easy to let w = φ0(p) or w = φ
¡
p, p
¢
in (29) to get
Gm [φ0(p)|p] `m (p) =
λ0u
δ + λ1 + s
· γm (p) ,
and the Þrst equation in (13) for ϕm (p).
Proof of the Proposition. Substitution of ϕ0n (w) · γn (p) for gn (w|p) `n (p), ϕn (w) · γn (p) for
Gn (w|p) `n (p), ϕm [q(w, p)] · γm (p) for Gm (w|p) `m (p) , and ϕm (p) · γm (p) for `m (p) in equations (28)
and (29) leads to the system of diﬀerential equations (12). The results in the above two paragraphs then
provide the associated initial conditions and prove points 1, 2 and 3 of the Proposition altogether. ¤
B Solution of system (12)
System (12) of Proposition 1 shows that ϕn (p) is constant over non matching segments, and strictly
increasing over matching segments. Recalling that Γm (p) = Γ (p)− Γn (pi) over any matching segment
starting at pi, (12) solves as:
ϕm (p) = ϕm (pi) ·
·
δ + λ1Γm (pi)
δ + λ1Γm (p)
¸ λ1Γn (pi)(λ1+s)
λ1Γn (pi)(λ1+s)−δs ·
·
δ + (λ1 + s)Γ (pi)
δ + (λ1 + s)Γ (p)
¸λ1Γn (pi)(λ1+s)−2δs
λ1Γn (pi)(λ1+s)−δs
(30)
20Since φ(p0, p) ≤ w if and only if p0 ≤ q(w, p).
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over any such segment, and as:
ϕm (p) = ϕm (pi) ·
δ + (λ1 + s)Γ (pi)
δ + (λ1 + s)Γ (p)
(31)
over a non matching segment starting at pi.
C Proof of Proposition 2
First implication. The assertion that condition (26) is implied by the fact that all Þrms with
p ∈ £p, pn¤ choose not to match outside oﬀers is quite obvious. Indeed, this fact has the following two
immediate implications:
1. γm (p) ≡ 0 over
£
p, pn
¤
,
2. ∆π (p) < 0 over
£
p, pn
¤
.
Now the deÞnition (24) of ∆π (p) and, together with point 1 above, in turn imply that
∆π (p) =
λ0u
nc
(δ + λ1)
δ + λ1 (1− n)∆J (b, p)
for all p ∈ £p, pn¤. Point 2 is then implies condition (26).
Second implication. The reverse implication is less straightforward. We Þrst need to show that
condition (26) implies that the same inequality holds for all p ≤ pn, that is, for all q ≤ pn:Z q
b
(ρ− r − λ1) (λ1 + s)Γ (x)− λ1 (ρ+ δ)
r + δ + (λ1 + s)Γ (x)
dx > 0.
This is easily proved by contradiction. Suppose there exists a q ∈ ¡p, pn¢ such that the above integral be
strictly negative. Then, since the numerator of the integrand is decreasing in x,21 it has to be the case
that
(ρ− r − λ1) (λ1 + s)Γ (x)− λ1 (ρ+ δ) < 0
for all x ≥ q. As a consequence, the function
p 7→
Z p
b
(ρ− r − λ1) (λ1 + s)Γ (x)− λ1 (ρ+ δ)
r + δ + (λ1 + s)Γ (x)
dx
21This uses the fact that ρ− r − λ1 has to be positive, otherwise condition (26) could not hold.
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is decreasing for all p ≥ q, which implies in particular that it takes a negative value at pn, thus contra-
dicting condition (26).
A particular implication of condition (26) is therefore that ∆J
¡
b, p
¢
< 0, which clearly implies that
∆π
¡
p
¢
< 0. By the continuity of p 7→ ∆π (p), this shows that there exists a q > p such that ∆π (p) < 0
over
£
p, q
¤
. Firms with productivities within this last interval thus choose not to match oﬀers.
Now let q be the supremum of all such qs. If q ≥ pn, then the Proposition is proved. In the reverse
case, the continuity of ∆π (p) over
£
p, q
¢
implies that limq%q∆π (q) = 0. But, by the deÞnition of q, this
is equivalent to saying that limq%q∆J (b, q) = 0. We thus have found a q < pn such that
Z q
b
(ρ− r − λ1) (λ1 + s)Γ (x)− λ1 (ρ+ δ)
r + δ + (λ1 + s)Γ (x)
dx = 0,
which, as we saw, violates condition (26). ¤
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